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Abstract: In this article, I will discuss 
Aron Gurwitsch's criticism of Edmund Husserl's 
theory of hyletic data. First, Husserl’s doctrine 
will be summarized in its earliest complete 
formulation. It will then be seen that Gur-
witsch's problem with this doctrine is primarily 
due to his acceptance of gestalt theoretic or-
ganization. He conceives of hyletic data as 
being a kind of formless stuff that undergoes 
organization by morphetic components of the 
noesis, which represents a dualism in percep-
tion. Instead, Gurwitsch wants to show us that 
the organization of these contents is autoch-
thonous. I will consider Gurwitsch's criticism 
against Husserl's own writings, and especially 
those that were not available to Gurwitsch. It 
will be seen that Husserl continues to develop 
this doctrine and that it very interestingly un-
dergoes a kind of noematization and exhibits 
certain displays of autochthonous organization 
that in the end are not far from Gurwitsch's 
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Resumen: Este artículo versará sobre la 
crítica de Aron Gurwitsch de los data hyléticos 
de Edmund Husserl. En primer lugar, se resu-
mirá la doctrina de Husserl en su primera for-
mulación completa. A continuación, se verá que 
el problema de Gurwitsch con esta doctrina se 
debe principalmente a su aceptación de la or-
ganización teórica de la Gestalt. Él concibe los 
data hyléticos como una especie de material 
amorfo que se somete a organización por los 
componentes de morphé de la noesis, lo que 
representa un dualismo en la percepción. En 
cambio, Gurwitsch quiere mostrarnos que la 
organización de estos contenidos es autóctona. 
Se examinará la crítica de Gurwitsch acerca de 
los escritos del propio Husserl y especialmente 
de aquellos que no estuvieron al alcance de 
Gurwitsch. Se verá que Husserl sigue desarro-
llando esta doctrina y que curiosamente sufre 
una especie de noematización y muestra ciertas 
manifestaciones de organización autóctona que, 
a la postre, no están lejos de la concepción 
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Noesis and noema are two moments of what Edmund Husserl the total act. 
They work in a parallel fashion, the noesis evanesces in time while constituting 
and the noema that is or can be identical throughout different acts as consti-
tuted. In a similar kind of structure, he distinguishes two really inherent mo-
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ments within the noesis itself being a kind of form and matter or, to use the 
language that he introduces, morphē and hylē respectively. Morphē are inten-
tional or apprehensional and formative components, while hylē are a kind of 
non-intentional material, i. e., literally a “stuff”; hyletic data are more generally 
and commonly known as sense data, which are, in a way, organized or made 
intentional by morphetic activity. On their own, hyletic data are simply the sen-
suous aspect of mental processes, i. e., color data, tone data, tactile data, etc., 
and are not to be confused with appearing aspects of the transcendent object 
itself or even appearance thereof; hyletic data are really immanent or inherent 
to the act and are neither actual parts of the object itself nor noematic in any 
way. The idea is that these various fields of sense data, each pertaining to 
some sense, are synthesized together and made intentional to constitute ob-
jects as they appear. An example to help keep hyletic data and noematic ap-
pearances separated is that of the green color of the leaves of a tree as they 
appear, i. e., noematically, and the fantastic multiplicity of shades of green in-
volved in the sensing or the apparent size changes with distance, which are the 
hyletic data. 
Now, Aron Gurwitsch objects to this doctrine of hyletic data outright and al-
together: “In the first place, the notion of hyletic data, the sense data of tradi-
tional philosophy and psychology, has to be abandoned”1. It is his position that 
this doctrine endorses a traditional dualistic theory of perception in which sense 
data that depend exclusively on external stimulation are by some supervenient 
organizing power made into perceptions. Hyletic data in such a case, then, are 
the elementary materials from which perception arises through some kind of 
apprehensional interpretation or formation of this material. As elemental they 
retain their identity strictly no matter how they are apprehended, i. e., the as-
sumption would be that they maintain a kind of independence of the morphetic 
or apperceptive characters. The possibility of describing such data and such a 
process Gurwitsch believes to be beyond the powers of phenomenological 
method and that without such availability for description it becomes apparent 
 
 
1 Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin, in The Collected 
Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973), vol. III, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, pp. 41s.   
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that there is no such noetic organizational activity. Instead it is descriptively 
revealed that organization is autochthonous to perception. 
It is my position that Gurwitsch is correct in some ways on this matter, but 
in many ways Husserl's complex and detailed discussions of hyletic data do not 
fit so easily into the model of a traditional dualistic or two-strata theory of per-
ception. It will be seen how such is exceeded in important ways in the case that 
Husserl makes. Ultimately, it is possible to even identify a kind of noematiza-
tion of hyletic data in his work, possibly in a way that Gurwitsch himself would 
possibly accept. In the following, I will present a brief account of Husserl's posi-
tion on hyletic data. Then I will explore some of Gurwitsch's problems to some 
detail to which I will offer a more complex view of Husserl's position that in 
some important ways seems to resist these certain aspects of this criticism. 
Finally, I will consider Gurwitsch's important contribution to this discussion in 
terms of a more holistic approach to perception and a new understanding of the 
role of noeses in a correlation conception of consciousness that may obsoletize 
any need for hyletic data. 
 
 
1. A GENERAL SUMMARY OF HUSSERL'S FORMULATION OF HYLETIC DATA 
 
Husserl introduces the distinction of hylē and morphē in order to correct for 
some of the problems that have arisen out of the tradition of sensation in psy-
chology. In the same way that Husserl introduces the distinction of noesis and 
noema in order to amend Brentano’s confusion of intentional acts and objects 
with his position of “mental inexistence”, the introduction of hyletic data in 
Ideas I is designed to work out certain aspects of this same problem. The tradi-
tional psychologistic account of sensation is that such are physically caused by 
external objects stimulating our sense organs. The philosophical problem with 
this position is that the causes of sensation are, then, mediate and indirectly 
available in some transcendent worldly domain not immediately or directly 
available to consciousness, i. e., these causes are, then, beyond the powers of 
phenomenological description. Sensations are in this way the point of access to 
the transcendent material world. For Husserl in his Logical Investigations sensa-
tions become the “stuff” of both elementary apprehension and those higher 
level acts founded upon these, which is the formulation that will factor largely 
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in Gurwitsch's understanding of these affairs. Thus, in the case of perceiving a 
word, there is the simple apprehension of a physical shape and the higher 
sense founded upon this of a word’s meaning. Sensation also plays the role of 
fulfillment for perceptual apprehensions. This still is naïve in the sense that 
sensation plays the role of a kind of “window” to transcendent reality, but this 
will be corrected in Ideas I with the epochē of the transcendent domain. 
In Ideas I we are left with a transcendental residue of sensation that cannot 
serve as a window to the transcendent because transcendence has been sus-
pended by the epochē. Instead, sensation is now a moment within the correla-
tion itself as a kind of noetic parallel to the noema. The primary difference, 
though, is that hyletic data are not objectifying on their own, i. e., they do not 
of themselves present us with an identical object through several moments of 
time. Hyletic data are not moments of the object as experienced, but moments 
of the experiencing of that object and they pertain to all five fields of the 
senses. Husserl describes hylē and morphē in the following way: 
 
We find such concrete really immanental Data as components in more inclusive con-
crete mental processes which are intentive as wholes; and, more particularly, we find 
those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, “animates”, which 
bestows sense […] a stratum by which precisely the concrete intentive mental process 
arises from the sensuous, which has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality.2 
 
Further on in the same section, Husserl, in Kantian fashion, refers to hyletic 
data as “formless stuff” and morphē as “stuffless forms”. More than being just 
the data of sensuous intuition, hyletic data for Husserl include the emotional 
and volitional as well. If we hear a violin, to use Husserl's example, or a baby 
crying or television in another room, the hyletic data refer to the sound without 
the assumption that the sound is produced by some real violin, baby, or televi-
sion set; we are just concentrating on the qualitatively distinctive tone without 
objective reference, which may be easier in the unfamiliar or experiences of 
impressionism or modern art designed to elucidate such things. Hyletic data 
intuitively fill our experience with the actual sensations of a certain object 
within a certain field of sensation. In this way they contribute to the experience 
of an object as being present and motivate our belief in the reality of such ob-
jects, which sustains the natural attitude. 
 
 
2 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philoso-
phy, Book I, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, p. 172. Trans. Frederick Kersten. 
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In order to understand hyletic data better it is good to contrast such with 
their noematic counterparts in the case of simple perception. The example that 
Husserl uses is that of looking at a tree with interest in the color of the trunk. 
This color is noematic and belongs to the tree as it is perceived. On the noetic 
side, Husserl says that we “find in it ‘something like color’: namely, the ‘sensed 
color’, that hyletic moment of the concrete mental process by which the noe-
matic, or ‘objective’, color is adumbrated”3. The noematic color maintains an 
identity throughout changes, while the hyletic data are in a continuous flux of 
change and multiplicity of sensed colors from which the noematic unity is con-
stituted. Husserl writes:  
 
The color of the seen physical thing is, of essential necessity, not a really inherent 
moment of the consciousness of color; it appears, but while it is appearing the appear-
ance can and must, in the case of a legitimating experience, be continually changing. 
The same color appears “in” continuous multiplicities of color adumbrations.4  
 
We say the tree trunk is “brown”, but in the actual sensing of it the multi-
plicity of shades of brown can reach to a qualitative infinity. The varying ap-
pearance of the tree as one either approaches it or backs away from it also ex-
emplifies the different roles played conjunctively by hyletic data and noemata. 
It would appear that the tree increases in size as one approaches it and de-
creases as one backs away. Noematically speaking, the tree has not changed 
size whatsoever and remains constant throughout this multiplicity of varying 
appearances. It is through the hyletic data that we can account for these 
changing appearances, which is interesting. On a more mundane note, this 
phenomenon makes possible snap-shots of one’s companions “holding” the Eif-
fel Tower in the palm of their hands. 
Husserl does discuss hyletic data as being somehow “animated” by a kind 
of noetic activity, which goes against the charge of elementalism. The idea is 
that if we analyze our sensuous experiences we will find, on the one hand, a 
kind of immanent sensuous data, i. e., hyle, and on the other a formative activ-
ity, i. e., morphe, together constituting objective experience. In one place he 




3 Ibidem, p. 202. 
4 Ibidem, p. 74.  
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We find such concrete really immanental Data as components in more inclusive con-
crete mental processes which are intentive as wholes; and, more particularly, we find 
those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, “animates”, which 
bestows sense (or essentially involves a bestowing of sense —a stratum by which pre-
cisely the concrete intentive mental process arises from the sensuous, which has in it-
self nothing pertaining to intention-nality.5 
 
It is through this animation, then, that our sensations lend themselves to 
become perceptions of objects and the objective world. Gurwitsch accurately 
summarizes Husserl in the following way: 
[B]y themselves hyletic data are not perspectival perceptual appearances of 
things; taken in themselves, they have no presentational function. That func-
tion is bestowed on them by the apperceptive characters which synthesize 
hyletic data of different compartments of sensibility and transform them into 
perceptual appearances of things. As a result of such synthesis, there arises the 
consciousness of one intersensorial object which, as identically the same, can 
be perceived under its visual, tactile, and other aspects, and also the con-
sciousness of perceptual space which, as numerically identical, can be both 
seen and touched6. 
Now that we have a decent understanding of Hyletic data in Husserlian 




2.  GURWITSCH’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE DOCTRINE OF HYLETIC DATA  
AND CASE FOR ITS REJECTION 
 
Gurwitsch understands Husserl's doctrine of hyletic data in the following 
way. In order to explain perceptual experience, Husserl introduces a two-strata 
(dualistic) theory composed of sensuous hyletic data and organizational noetic 
acts or morphē. Hyletic data are the elements or raw sense data, which are 
actively structured and bestowed with meaning by the higher level morphē 
without which they would not be organized or structured whatsoever, which is a 
strong claim of his; hyletic data are in this sense just a “stuff” that maintains its 
elemental identity throughout different sense-bestowings or apprehensions. 
 
 
5 Ibidem, p. 172. 
6 Aron Gurwitsch, “Edmund Husserl's Conception of Phenomenological Psychology”, in Phenomenol-
ogy and the Theory of Science, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 100. Edited by 
Lester Embree. 
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Gurwitsch describes this two-strata structure in the following way: “percepts 
are asserted to grow out of mere sense-data owing to supervenient factors (of 
whatever kind and description) by means of which sensations are interpreted 
and meaning is bestowed upon them”7. It is possible to illustrate the manner in 
which hylē and morphē work together using Husserl's example of a written 
word. On the one hand there is the physical manifestation of the word, which in 
this case is the dark ink on a light background of paper, or in hyletic terms the 
sensing of contiguous light and dark color data. When on the other hand we 
attend to the signification of the word, we are bestowing this material with the 
structure of meaning, which is the contribution of morphē. It is by the influence 
of morphē that the black sense data becomes letters against a light back-
ground. Morphē in this way are founded upon the underlying hyletic data. Gur-
witsch believes that Carl Stumpf’s distinction of “appearance” and “function” 
most likely influenced Husserl to adopt this position of hylē and morphē.  
In this doctrine of hyletic data, Gurwitsch identifies something like elemen-
tal or supervenient organization. He believes that it implies that hyletic data on 
their own are absolutely devoid of structure and organization. He writes: “Hyle 
itself means nothing but is merely given, a multitude of contents which acquires 
sense and order only through noetic functions. The hyletic itself is ‘formless 
stuff’, merely present and nothing more”8. According to Gurwitsch, the implica-
tions of such a theory are untenable, which include the problem of descriptively 
confirming raw and formless hyletic data, problems pertaining to the assump-
tion that hyletic data somehow remain unaffected by apprehensional changes, 
and the general problem of an elemental or supervenient theory of organiza-
tion. The lattermost point, of course, is the crux of Gurwitsch's argument 
against Husserl's doctrine and informs the other points. The importance of this 
is that Gurwitsch believes that the rejection of this doctrine leads to a strict cor-
relation theory of intentionality losing any understanding of noeses to be ani-
mating or organizing agents of any kind, which, among other things, has the 
benefit of elegance. 
 
 
7 Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin, p. 86. 
8 Aron Gurwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation be-
tween Gestalt Theory and henomenology”, in The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973), vol. 
II: Studies in Psychology and Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 281. Edited by Fred Ker-
sten. 
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It is difficult and, according to Gurwitsch, impossible to descriptively con-
firm raw hyletic data. If the relationship of morphē to hylē is as founded to 
founding, then morphē requires or even presupposes hyletic data as its physical 
substratum, which effectively blends the two into a total act. Gurwitsch has no 
problem with this, but points out that if this is the case then a third noetic stra-
tum mediating between hylē and morphē would have to be assumed in order to 
explain the articulation and structure of what are assumed to be formless 
hyletic data. What this means is that formless hyletic data as formless are im-
possible to phenomenologically confirm in that they are unavailable for descrip-
tion. Ultimately, Gurwitsch makes the point that it is impossible to abstractively 
separate hylē and morphē in order to consider them on their own for the reason 
that such would change what is given into something absolutely foreign, which 
we will come to understand as a problem in the following. 
According to Gurwitsch, Husserl holds the position that hyletic data are a 
kind of foundational elemental material that is not modified other than appar-
ently through the activity of sense-bestowal or even different sense-bestowals 
as can happen with the change of perspective or attitude as we have seen 
above. Instead, it rigidly maintains its identity and determined properties as 
whatever kind of “stuff” it happened to be before sense-bestowal and continues 
to be when left alone or with other kinds of sense-bestowal; its identity is con-
stant, but somehow can be “molded” in different ways without really being af-
fected by this. Gurwitsch describes the independence of hyletic data from mor-
phetic or apprehensional activity in the following way: “Whatever the appercep-
tive characters bestow or confer on hyletic data does not change or modify the 
latter in their proper nature, but merely supervenes upon them”9. Gurwitsch 
identifies this position as the crux of the problem concerning Husserl's 
hylē/morphē doctrine. Husserl claims that these elements of perception can 
themselves be perceived in cases of perceptual doubt or ambiguity. The exam-
ple of a wax figurine illustrates this. On first glance it may be that one sees 
some famous human being, but then on closer inspection it is revealed that 
such is a wax sculpture quite realistically resembling that person. In this case 
the same elemental material is animated in two different ways; one and the 
same stock of hyletic data is the common support for two overlapping appre-
 
 
9 Aron Gurwitsch, “Edmund Husserl's Conception of Phenomenological Psychology”, p. 100. 
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hensions. Rather than assuming a constant and independent underlying layer of 
sensation that can be animated in various ways while retaining its identity like 
some kind of building blocks that can be put together in this way and that and 
then reassembled again or reapprehended as the case may be, it is rather Gur-
witsch's position that the very identity and being of such data changes by shifts 
of attention with thematic modifications and the different roles engendered by 
such changes in organization: “The two-strata theory is untenable. […] It is not 
the case that a new element [...] is superadded to the complex”10. It is not the 
case that anything is given without organization and structure, much less what 
is believed to be the foundation of perception. Gurwitsch summarizes his posi-
tion in the following way: 
 
Quite in general, sensuous material is not articulated by means of higher functions. 
What is immediately given, the phenomenological primal material, is given only as ar-
ticulated and structured. Data devoid of all articulation, hyletic data in the strict sense, 
do not exist at all. What is given depends on the structural connections within which it 
appears. There are no data remaining unaffected by changes in organization, articula-
tion, etc.11 
Gurwitsch even points to similar prohibitions in Husserl's own work.  
 
At this point, it is helpful to keep in mind Gurwitsch’s Gestalt-informed 
meriology or whole-part theory of organization. In terms of organization, for 
him an absolutely independent part that strongly maintains its identity across 
change that is actual or apprehensional is utterly impossible. Instead, we have 
come to understand that parts are both functionally significant for the wholes of 
which they are a part and also contribute to the whole in playing the assigned 
role. Parts are not meaningful of themselves as any kind of elemental theory 
would necessitate, but derive this meaning from their context and the whole of 
which they are a part and in which they play a role. The example of a musical 
melody illustrates this point well. If we were to take the tone data of a melody 
as some kind of elemental hylē, which are animated by the melodic morphē, we 
would have to say that such should be the same in every melody and that it is 
just the apprehension that is different. It is rather the case that notes are actu-
ally different when included in different melodies. Certainly Mozart’s Requiem 
and Beethoven’s 9th share some of the same notes, but we have to remark how 
 
 
10 Aron Gurwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation be-
tween Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology”, p. 283. 
11 Ibidem, pp. 283. 
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different their being is in these two contexts and how different any such note 
would be when given abstracted and on its own without a melodic context. 
When viewing the whole containing a certain part, from that standpoint the part 
dissolves into its context and role. If we were to isolate this part, if such is even 
possible in a given case, all things would change because the part would now 
be its own whole and our new theme. In application to the doctrine of hyletic 
date, Gurwitsch writes:  
 
A separation between hyle and morphe is not even abstractively possible, for disre-
garding morphe and concentrating upon hyle alone entails a change in what is given. 
[…] Hyletic reflection as reflection on the hyle alone is thus not reflection in the proper 
sense. It is a thematic modification —namely, singling out.12  
 
For all of these reasons Gurwitsch recommends relinquishing the doctrine of 
hyletic data and endorses a theory of intentionality in which noeses in general 
do not have an animating function, i. e., they are not “morphetic” in any way. 
 
 
3. ASPECTS OF HUSSERL'S POSITION THAT EXCEED GURWITSCH'S CRITIQUE 
 
Husserl would have to respond to Gurwitsch’s criticisms that hyletic data 
have been therein misrepresented to some degree. A point of primary signifi-
cance is that Husserl’s texts do not definitively support the claim that hyletic 
data are an utterly formless and unorganized material. In many places 
throughout texts that were available for Gurwitsch it is clear that Husserl de-
scribes them as having form and organization apart from morphetic activity. It 
should be noted that Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis, which contains some of 
Husserl's best descriptions of formed and organized hyletic data in the discus-
sions of association, was not published until after Gurwitsch's Field of Con-
sciousness was published, which is the primary text in which he lodges his 
complaint against hyletic data. There are the “Thing and Space Lectures” of 
1907 in which Husserl is known to have discussed hyletic data as inherently and 
premorphetically organized. Still, the Logical Investigations and Ideas I contain 
plenty of such clues that would have to be considered in an accurate formula-
 
 
12 Ibidem, p. 284. 
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tion of Husserl's doctrine, which seem to be absent from Gurwitsch's considera-
tion.  
As early as the Logical Investigations, Husserl worked to clearly distinguish 
sensations as sensed, i. e., hyletic data, from objective or noematic aspects of 
the object that is perceived. In the context of working to avoid the psycholo-
gism of confusing aspects of the act with aspects of the object as he believes 
John Locke did, Husserl writes: “Sensations, animated by interpretations, pre-
sent objective determinations in corresponding percepts of things, but they are 
not themselves these objective determinations”13. This description is interesting 
because it is discussing the hylē-morphē structure that we introduced above 
making it clear that the morphē animate the hylē, but it is especially important 
because an example that Husserl gives of such a sensation is that of “shape” in 
addition to “color” and “smoothness”. The latter two can be more accepted as 
being some kind of unorganized sensational stuff that Gurwitsch has been dis-
cussing, but the idea of some kind of a shape is difficult to accept as being es-
sentially disorganized. Husserl employs the shape example again in Ideas I in 
the following way:  
 
One and the same shape appears continuously but always “in a different manner”, al-
ways in different adumbrations of shape. […] Each phase of the perception necessarily 
contains a determined content of adumbrations of color, adumbrations of shape, etc. 
They are included among “the data of sensations”.14  
 
Further on in the same paragraph, Husserl discusses the morphetic anima-
tion of such data emphasizing that such adumbrations are really inherent parts 
of the mental process and gives the example of the shape of a triangle as such 
an adumbration. These examples of organization taken from the Logical Inves-
tigations and Ideas I are interesting in many ways, but it must be said are far 
from definitively demonstrating premorphetic organization in hyletic data. How 
are we to know in these that morphetic construings or interpretations are not 
already present? We have to look further to support the position that hyletic 
data of themselves display aspects of structure and organization.  
 
 
13 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Amherst, NY, Humanity Books, 20002. Vid. Investigation 
II, § 10, p. 356. Trans. John Niemeyer Findlay. 
14 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philoso-
phy, p. 74.  
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There is good evidence that hyletic data are not inherently chaotic in 
Husserl's Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. William McKenna 
points out that in Husserl's discussions of the passive synthesis of the living 
present in this work that hyletic data are described in terms of exhibiting basic 
organizational structures15. Among such organizational structures are some that 
would be very interesting to Gurwitsch for the reason that it is no stretch at all 
to see aspects of gestalt organization implicit and, one could even say, autoch-
thonous in these structures such as simple grouping (pairing) and the figure-
ground relationship. Husserl makes the claim that hyletic data are organized 
according to basic principles such as similarity or dissimilarity of content and 
admits of the possibility of varying degrees of such. Husserl writes: 
 
But these necessarily have a unity through consciousness, a unity of kinship, as similar 
to one another or uniform with one another: Several discrete color-data in the visual 
field are grouped together; they are especially united by virtue of their similarity; and 
they are united in different ways as well. This kinship has its degrees and according to 
them it unites them now more strongly, now more weakly.16 
 
The examples that Husserl employs are interesting in this case because 
they are clearly formed. He speaks of red squares overlapping blue ones as well 
as red triangles and so on. The case of the overlapping squares brings out two 
very interesting principles of hyletic organization. Husserl describes these in the 
following way: “(i) the synthetic-coinciding in a commonality, that is, in a 
sameness, and yet (ii) the synthetic conflict of particular matters of this com-
monality that repress one another reciprocally in the process of overlapping”17. 
We can imagine in the case of a blue square overlapping a red one that the 
blue data will be organized together as a unity and be, thus, distinct from the 
data of the red square. It is here that we see figure-ground organization taking 
place. In the case of simply one blue square the blue data and shape of that 
figure form a unity that is sharply distinguished from the background of dissimi-
lar data that is not part of the figure. In similar ways we can see much the 
same happening in pairs or groups of similar objects that there is something in 
 
 
15 Cfr. William McKenna, “The Problem of Sense Data in Husserl's Theory of Perception”, in Essays 
in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch, Lanham, MD, Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology / Univer-
sity Press of America, 1984, pp. 223–240. Edited by Lester Embree. 
16 Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental 
Logic, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p. 129. Trans. Anthony Steinbock. 
17 Ibidem, p. 130. 
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either their uniformity or similarity that holds them together and distinguishes 
them from the background.  
To be clear that Husserl is discussing hyletic data in these examples, we 
have to raise questions concerning the place of such data and the manner of its 
organization. In the first place, Husserl clearly has in mind hyletic data, which 
he is careful to proclaim in the following way early in the section: “we are 
speaking about immanent data, for example about concrete color-data in the 
unity of a streaming present”18. Concerning the relationship of such similar or 
uniform data forming a figure or figures, he is careful to point out that such 
organization is not the adventitious association of like for like objects in the 
world, but is rather the inherent similarity of immanent contents that he de-
scribes as a “materially relevant community”19. The language is certainly strik-
ing considering the important status of relevancy in Gurwitsch's understanding 
of organization. Relevance is the glue, so to speak, of gestalt organization. 
Additionally, in Husserl's Experience and Judgment he clearly defines hyletic 
data as being organized. In § 16 of this work he wants to consider what he 
there names “passive data” by which he means hyletic data on its own, which 
he realizes is only possible abstractively. In order to render such data intuitive 
and bring it to view so to speak, he abstractively withholds from the formative 
affects of egoic sense-bestowings, i. e., morphetic activity, upon such passive 
data; “an abstractive turning-of-regard is always possible, in which we make 
this apperceptive substratum itself into an object”20. With all such activity sus-
pended, Husserl makes the following observation: “this field is still not a pure 
chaos, a mere ‘swarm’ of ‘data’; it is a field of determinate structure, one of 
prominences and articulated particularities”21. The reason for this is that ac-
cording to Husserl this pre-objective sensuous data is even at this level already 
the product of constitutive synthesis at least of internal time consciousness. 
Further on, he writes: “A particular element in the field is raised to prominence 
in such a way that it contrasts with something”22. Here Husserl is analyzing the 
 
 
18 Ibidem, p. 129. 
19 Ibidem, p. 133. 
20 Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973, 
p. 73. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe; translated by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. 
21 Ibidem, pp. 72s. 
22 Ibidem, pp. 73s. 
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hyletic data of single sensuous fields, and points out that there is clearly a fig-
ure-ground organization present even at this level. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
There are two interesting directions that this research makes available. In 
Husserl, we see a noematization of hyletic data and in Gurwitsch we see a kind 
of purification of the correlation of noesis and noema. First, considering all of 
the clear evidence of Husserl discussing hyletic data in terms of being inher-
ently structured and organized, it is difficult to agree completely with Gurwitsch 
that such in any way can be considered a formless chaos. It is interesting that 
in all of the points that we have discussed above that Husserl does not in any of 
these places explain such structure and organization as the product of super-
venient morphē. He has focused the discussion on hyletic data abstractively 
from all else. We now have to wonder if he does not really have in mind some-
thing objective or, we may say, noematic, when he is discussing an organized 
hyletic data. There seems to be a noematization of hyletic data.  
Gurwitsch, though, believes that the relinquishment of the doctrine of 
hyletic data has the important effect of requiring a redefinition of the role of 
noeses in the theory of intentionality. On the whole, he identifies in Husserl's 
concept of noesis a strong similarity to role and being of morphē, i. e., some 
kind of animating or organizing function that has been discussed extensively 
above. We are then left with a definition of noesis as an experienced act of con-
sciousness in general: “After the distinction between hyle and morphe has been 
abandoned, the term ‘noesis’ extends to the experienced act of consciousness 
in its entirety”23. This enables a strictly correlative theory of intentionality in 
which noeses are real psychological events and their correlative noemata are 
ideal, atemporal, and reiterable. 
Thus, it is possible to generally conclude that Gurwitsch's call for dismissing 
Husserl's doctrine of hyletic data and the hyle-morphe relationship altogether, it 
has been seen, is derived from his acceptance of gestalt theory primarily. He 
 
 
23 Aron Gurwitsch, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation be-
tween Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology”, p. 284.  
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advances his argument along two related lines. First of all, it is his position that 
the supposition of an inherently formless and chaotic stuff is impossible. Ac-
cording to gestalt theory, all things have form and meaning to some extent. His 
second reason for calling for the dismissal of the morphe-hyle distinction is that 
he has shown are the problems of supervenient organization. It is not the case 
that there are formative moments, which are the morphe, and that these 
somehow organize the formless hyle. In his work, Gurwitsch makes the consis-
tent point that organization is autochthonous and inherent to the contents, 
which in this case are sensations. It is not the case that there is some super-
venient agency bringing order to the orderless or two distinct strata within the 
noesis working in this way. Regarding Gurwitsch's criticism, it has been seen 
that he is not entirely correct in conceiving of Husserl's hyletic data as a disor-
ganized, formless, stuff. Throughout Husserl's writings, including many that 
were available for Gurwitsch, hyletic data are often discussed in terms of being 
formed and organized even prior to the introduction of morphetic activity. Re-
garding the point of a supervenient theory of organization, i. e., a two-strata 
theory, Gurwitsch is accurate, though. Perhaps Husserl was on a trajectory that 
would eventually have come to something that Gurwitsch would accept as 
hyletic data became more and more noematic throughout his writings. 
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